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Suppose that you observe n choices of k goods and prices when the consumer is 
actually choosing from a set of k + 1 goods. Then revealed preference theory puts 
essentially no restrictions on the behavior of the data. This is true even if you also 
observe the quantity demanded of good k+ 1, or its price. The proofs of these 
statements are not difficult. Journal cf Economic Literature Classification 
Number: 022. ii? 1988 Academic Press. Inc. 
Suppose that we are given n observations on a consumer’s choices of k 
goods, (p,, x,), where pi and xi are nonnegative k-dimensional vectors. 
Under what conditions can we find a utility function u: Rk -+ R that 
rationalizes these observations? That is, when can we find a utility function 
that achieves its constrained maximum at the observed choices? 
This is, of course, a classical question of consumer theory. It has been 
addressed from two distinct viewpoints, the first known as integrabilitv 
theory and the second known as revealed preference theory. Integrability 
theory is appropriate when one is given an entire demand function while 
revealed preference theory is more suited when one is given a finite set of 
demand observations, the case described above. In the revealed preference 
case, it is well known that some variant of the Strong Axiom of Revealed 
Preference (SARP) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the data 
(pi, xi) to be consistent with utility maximization. 
Now suppose that we are also given n observations on another chosen 
good, (z,), i= 1, . . . . n, where zi is a nonnegative scalar, but we do not have 
a price series to accompany these observations. We now ask when will 
there exist a utility function u: Rk+ ’ + R that rationalizes the data 
(p,, xi, zi) for i = 1, . . . . n? Equivalently, we can ask when can we find a 
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series of scalar prices (qi) such that the entire data set (p,, qi, xi, zi) is 
consistent with utility maximization? 
This question is of considerable interest, since we typically can observe 
only a subset of the goods chosen by a consumer. For example, we would 
expect that the planned consumption of future goods would enter the 
utility function, and these are generally not observed. Similarly, contingent 
consumption plans are also not observed. 
The variables (zi) may also be interpreted as a “demographic” variable 
such as household size or household location. Such variables are often used 
in applied demand analysis to control for taste differences. Then we are 
asking when we can find a family of utility functions, u(x, z), parametrized 
by =, such that for each fixed 2, the data (pi, x,) satisfy the restrictions 
imposed by demand theory. I will return to this interpretation below. 
The first interpretation, that of a missing price, has been addressed in 
[3] in the intertemporal context, using the machinery of integrability 
theory. He shows that there are essentially no observable restrictions on 
demand functions in this context. Here we examine these issues using the 
methods of revealed preference theory and reach a similar conclusion. 
However, if one is willing to place bounds on the expenditure on the 
unobserved good, then we show that demand theory does impose some 
restrictions on the observed behavior. 
1. OBSERVED QUANTITIES, UNOBSERVED PRICES 
Let us first describe the form of the revealed preference conditions that 
we will use. If all prices and goods are observed, a necessary and sufficient 
condition for these choices to be consistent with utility maximization is 
that the data satisfy the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference 
(GARP). 
DEFINITION. An observation xi is directly revealed preferred to a bundle 
x (written xiRox) if pixi > pix. An observation is revealed preferred to a 
bundle I (written x;Rx) if there is some sequence such that 
xiRoxj-. x,R'x. A set of data (pi, x,), i= 1, . . . . n, satisfies the Generalized 
Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) if xiRxj implies pjx, < p,x,. 
Further information on these concepts may be found in Cl, 2, 51. GARP 
is a generalization of the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP) 
that allows for different quantity vectors to be observed for a single price 
vector. It is therefore appropriate for examining cases where preferences 
may be weakly convex, rather than strictly convex preferences as is 
required by SARP. 
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It is now easy to answer the question posed above. We simply ask when 
we can construct a price series (qi) for i= 1, . . . . n such that the entire data 
set (pi, qi, xi, zi) satisfies GARP. As it turns out this can be done simply by 
choosing large enough values for qi so that the expenditure on the z-good 
“swamps” the revealed preference comparison. The details are given in the 
following theorem. 
THEOREM 1. Let (pi, x,), i = 1, . . . . II, be a set of data and let (z;) be a set 
of n positive scalars. For each i, let Ei be the subset of the data that satisfies 
z, = z, for all t in Ei. Then the only restriction imposed by the maximization 
hypothesis is that the data (pi, x,) satisfy GARP in each subset E,. In par- 
ticular, if zi # zj for all i and j, so that Ei = { zi}, then the maximization 
model imposes no restrictions whatsoever on the observed choices. 
Proof: First we show that the condition is necessary. This follows easily 
from the fact that XEROX, implies that (x,, zi) R’(x,, zi) whatever the price 
qi. Thus a violation of GARP involving observations in Ei will necessarily 
create a violation of GARP with the additional good zi. 
In order to prove sufficiency, we will construct a set of prices (4;) such 
that the entire data set satisfies GARP. For each i choose q, such that 
qi > max 
i 
Pi(-u, - x,) 
,l . l$E, zr-zi 1 
(1) 
Within each subset Ei we are assured that the data satisfy GARP. What 
about across subsets? I claim that (xi, zi) R’(x,, z,) if and only if zi> zj, 
when z, and 2, are in different subsets Ej and E,. There are two cases: 
(1) zi > zi. Cross multiplying (1) we have 
Pi(“, - xi) + qi(zi - zji) > 0, 
which means that (x;, zi) R”(xj, 2,). 
(2) Zi<L,. Cross multiplying (1) again gives 
pi(X, - XI) + q,(Zj - Z,) < 0, 
which means that it is not the case that (xi, zi) R”(-yjui, zj). 
Given these choices for qi, is it possible that the set of data (pi, qi, xi, z,) 
could violate GARP? We know that there are no violations within the sub- 
sets E,, so any violations must involve observations from different subsets. 
But if (xi, z,) and (xi, zi) are in different subsets, we know that (xi,zi) 
R(x,, z,) if and only if zi > z, by construction. Thus a violation of GARP 
would imply zi > z, and zi < z,, which is a contradiction. 1 
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There are several remarks worth making about this theorem. First, if zi 
were a vector, we could simply choose a vector qi with zeros (or small 
numbers) in every component but one. The above construction would still 
work. Second, the numbers Z, provide a complete preference ordering for 
the subsets Ei. Within each subset, the data are partially ordered by the 
revealed preference order. 
If the variables (z;) are thought of as demographic variables we can use 
Afriat’s theorem, as described in [S], to construct a piecewise linear utility 
function, u(x, z), that will rationalize the data in the required sense. Thus, 
as long as we don’t have any violations of revealed preference for fixed 
values of the demographic variables, the maximization hypothesis puts no 
restrictions on the behavior of the choice data. 
2. OBSERVED PRICES, UNOBSERVED QUANTITIES 
The above theorem raises the question of what happens if we observe 
prices for the omitted good but not quantities? In this case we get no 
restrictions of any sort. 
THEOREM 2. Let (pi, xi), i = 1, . . . . n, be a set of data and let (qi), 
i = 1, . . . . n, be a set of positive prices. Then there always exists a set of 
quantities (z;), i = 1, . . . . n, such that the data (pi, ql, xi, zi) satisfy GARP. 
Proof: Choose r1 = 0 and successively define 
bi+l >max 
i 
Pi+Ixi~Pi+Ix~+1+4i+I~-1 7 31 
I 
for i = 1, . . . . n - 1. 
4i+ I 
Then for all i = 1, . . . . n - 1 we have 
so that each observation i+ 1 is revealed preferred to observation i. Thus 
the data must satisfy GARP. 1 
Note that the data can be reordered in any way desired so that any 
preference ordering is consistent with the data. Furthermore, if neither qi 
nor zi is observed there are clearly no restrictions whatsoever on the data 
(Pi9 xi). 
3. BOUNDING THE EXPENDITURE ON THE OMITTED GOOD 
In the constructions given above we have essentially made the expen- 
diture on the omitted good so large that it has “swamped” the revealed 
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preference comparisons. If we are willing to bound the expenditure on this 
good, we can get some restrictions on the subset of choices. 
THEOREM 3. Let (p,, x,), i = 1, . . . . n, he a set of data and (z,), i = 1, . . . . n, 
be an omitted good. Suppose that we postulate that the maximum expenditure 
possible on the omitted good is bounded by (e,), i= 1, . . . . n. Then the data 
(p,, xi, ei) are consistent with utility maximization if and on1.v if there is a 
positive solution ( Ui, Ai, d;) to he set of linear inequalities 
Ui 6 U, + 2, pi(x; - x;) + d,(z, - zi) 
d,zj d liei. 
Proof. Choose q, = dJ& and rewrite the inequalities in the form 
U,dU,+~,P,(X,-Xj)+~,qj(;j-Z,) 
4 ,z,<e,. 
But these are simply the Afriat inequalities which have been shown to be a 
necessary and sufficient condition for utility maximization in [l, 2, 51. 1 
In order for this result to be of interest, we have to show that the 
inequality conditions given in Theorem 3 are not vacuous. A simple 
example will suffice. 
Suppose, for example, that we have two observations on three goods 
with the following specifications: .x1 = (1,2), x2 = (2, l), p, = (1,2), 
p*=(2,1), Z, = 1, and z2 =2. It is easy to see that these observations 
violate the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference. Suppose that we try 
to patch things up by choosing prices (q,, q2) so that observation 2 is not 
revealed preferred to observation 1. This implies that 
5 + 2q, 6 4 + 42, 
which yields 
which is impossible. 
Since that doesn’t work, let’s try to assure that observation 1 is not 
revealed preferred to observation 2. In this case we have 
5+q, <4+2q,, 
which implies that q, > 1. Thus the expenditure on Z, must be at least 1 in 
order to satisfy the revealed preference restrictions. It follows that if the 
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bound on the expenditure on the omitted good is less than 1, the data 
cannot be consistent with GARP. 
If (qi) is observed but (zi) is not observed, a similar set of inequalities 
can be constructed, but they are now nonlinear. This is also the case if total 
expenditure is observed, but neither qi nor zi is observed. 
Theorem 3 suggests a way to check for “significant violations” of 
revealed preference. Suppose that we have a set of data (p,, xi, z,) that 
violates revealed preference. It would be convenient to have an “index” of 
the degree of violation of revealed preference. One way to do this would be 
to find the smallest value C? such that the inequalities 
Ui< Ui+~jpj(X,-Xj)+dj(Z;-2,) 
have a positive solution. The number F tells us how much the expenditure 
would have to be on the z-good in order to satisfy the restrictions of utility 
maximization. If the z-good is a demographic variable, 2 would give us an 
index of how important it would have to be for it to account for the taste 
differences necessary to describe the data. Since the inequalities described in 
Theorem 3 are linear in the unknown variables, checking for feasibility 
does not pose undue computational difficulties. 
4. CONCLUSION 
If the utility function is assumed to have some special structure such as 
separability-where u(x, z) has the form U(v(x), z)-it is well known that 
maximization does impose restrictions on the data (pi, xi). These restric- 
tions are summarized in [6]. However, without this assumption of special 
structure, there are essentially no restrictions imposed by the maximization 
model on a subset of the choice data. 
I take this to be a negative result, similar in spirit to the Sonnenschein- 
Mantel-Debreu results described in [4], although obviously not as deep. 
The sad fact of the matter is that the restrictions imposed by the 
optimization hypothesis only apply when we have observed the entire 
choice set. Hence the normal sorts of tests for consistency of observed 
choice must be interpreted instead as tests for separability of the observed 
choices from other variables in the utility function rather than test of 
maximization per se. 
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